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Abstract 
How can the quantitative easing (QE) programme launched in March 
2015 by the ECB be successful in the Eurozone (EZ)? What will be its 
impact on the member countries? And how will it relate to countries' 
fiscal policies? To address these questions, we use a simple extension of 
the three-equation New Keynesian model. We modify the benchmark 
model in two respects: 1) we (re)-introduce an LM money supply and 
demand equation to capture the fact that the ECB operates at the zero 
lower bound and hence cannot use a standard Taylor rule; and 2) we 
extend the model to a two-country framework. The model supports the 
ECB official view that the channel whereby QE is meant to operate is 
the reversal of  deflationary expectations. It also highlights that 
instrumental to this goal is the elimination of persistent output gaps, 
both at the EZ and at the country level, and hence the reduction of 
country-specific interest-rate spreads − the "unofficial" objective of the 
programme. We show that QE, if large enough, can succeed for the EZ 
as a whole. The ECB nevertheless cannot also close individual countries' 
output gaps, unless specific and unrealistic conditions are met. In this 
case fiscal accommodation at the country level should also intervene. 
We show that QE can enhance the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and 
therefore conclude that the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies 
is of paramount importance 
Keywords: Monetary Policy, ECB, Deflation, Zero-Lower-Bound, Fiscal 
Policy 
JEL Codes: E3, E4, E5 
                                            
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 56th Annual Meeting of the 
Italian Economists' Society, Naples, October 23, 2015. We remain fully responsible 
for this paper. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) to launch a 
quantitative easing (QE) programme testifies of both the persistence of poor 
macroeconomic conditions in the Eurozone (EZ) and a major change in the 
monetary policy stance of the ECB with respect to the entrenched Brussels-
Berlin-Frankfurt consensus. The ECB justifies the QE programme (e.g. 
Draghi, 2014a, b) looking at the widening gap of both the actual and the 
expected inflation rate in the EZ below the official target "not exceeding but 
close to 2%" per year, in a context where the policy rate is at the zero lower 
bound (ZLB) and conventional monetary weapons have proved ineffective 
owing to deep "segmentation" and "nationalisation" of financial markets. 
The programme will be carried on at least until September 2016, and in any 
case until the inflation rate will be on target.   
 Though supported by authoritative academic research (e.g. Bernanke and 
Reinhart, 2004; Orphanides, 2014; De Grauwe and Ji, 2015) and welcomed 
by the majority of EZ governments, international partners and official 
institutions, QE is still surrounded by some scepticism. Assessment of 
experiences of QE forerunners (United States, United Kingdom, Japan) is 
mixed.1 Japan has not yet escaped from its long lasting stagnation, and 
while US and UK have been doing better than the EZ over the last five 
years, the specific impact of their large QE programmes is unclear. Quite 
reasonably, other concomitant factors, not least the fiscal stance of 
governments, also mattered. Hence two questions are particularly relevant 
as far as the EZ is concerned. First, how QE is expected to work where 
conventional monetary policy has failed. Second, what the fiscal stance of 
governments will be vis-à-vis QE and the EZ rules still in place.  
 How can QE be successful in the Eurozone (EZ)? What will be its impact 
on the member countries? And how will it relate to countries' fiscal policies? 
Clearly these questions are interconnected, and here we seek to provide a 
simple, though sufficiently detailed, macro-policy framework to address both 
of them. 
                                            
1 See e.g. Cecioni et al. (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2012), Bowdler and Radia (2012), 
and the supporting documents for the ECB European Parliament monetary 
dialogue, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-
dialogue.html. 
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 In section 2 we provide a preliminary discussion of QE, its 
implementation and its communication. Therein we clarify the rationale for 
QE put forward by the ECB, and how QE can be viewed as a reincarnation 
of monetary policy as a means to control the amount of money available in 
the economy.  In this connection, we highlight that the critical situation in 
the EZ is that, whereas the monetary policy rate is at the ZLB, the actual 
nominal and real interest rates that are relevant to economic activity in 
each country are well above zero. These high interest rates concur to 
determine persistent negative output gaps and deflationary expectations 
throughout the EZ, and they are therefore eligible as the intermediate 
target for the success of QE.  
 In section 3 we present a simple extension of the three-equation New 
Keynesian model to analyse the implementation and impact of QE. We 
modify the benchmark model in two respects: 1) we (re)-introduce an LM 
money demand equation to capture the fact that the ECB operates at the 
ZLB and hence cannot use a standard Taylor rule; and 2) we extend the 
model to a two-country framework. The model supports the ECB official 
view that the channel whereby QE is meant to operate is the reversal of  
deflationary expectations. It also confirms that instrumental to this goal is 
the elimination of persistent output gaps, both at the EZ and at the country 
level, and hence the reduction of country-specific interest-rate spreads − the 
"unofficial" objective of the programme. We show that QE, if large enough, 
can succeed for the EZ as a whole.  
 In section 4 we address the issue that the ECB nevertheless cannot also 
close individual countries' output gaps, unless specific and unrealistic 
conditions are met. In this case fiscal accommodation at the country level 
should also intervene. We show that QE can enhance the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy, and therefore conclude that the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies is of paramount importance.  
 Conclusions and policy implications are summarised in section 5. 
 
2. A preliminary note on quantitative easing, its 
implementation and its communication 
  
To begin with, ends and means of QE should be defined appropriately. 
The case for QE, as generally explained and communicated, is that the 
central bank wishes to achieve a policy goal that it can no longer achieve by 
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means of "conventional" instruments owing to the "zero lower bound" (ZLB) 
problem of the policy rate. Depending on their mandate, institutional 
framework and communication style, central banks that have so far engaged 
in QE have also communicated somewhat different policy goals: foster the 
recovery of economic activity, prevent a deflationary spiral, raise 
inflationary expectations, spur credit supply. In the EZ, according to the 
ECB, the main QE rationale is to stop a deflationary drift and realign 
inflation expectations with the 2% target (e.g. Draghi, 2014a, b). This 
communication strategy is clearly in tune with the single mandate of the 
ECB for price stability. 
But why is QE necessary? The New Keynesian workhorse model for 
policy making (see below, section 3) provides and oft-heard narrative. The 
monetary stance is considered to be restrictive when in the so-called IS 
function we have the following inequality: 
interest rate − expected inflation > equilibrium real rate, 
which at the ZLB is rewritten as 
− expected inflation > equilibrium real rate 
This inequality yields a negative output gap (aggregate demand below 
potential supply). It may occur from various combination of factors such as 
very low or negative equilibrium real rate, too low inflation target of the 
central bank, expected inflation below target or negative (e.g. Krugman, 
1998). The negative output gap, via the so-called Phillips Curve feeds back 
onto negative inflation gaps, which in turn triggers low or negative expected 
inflation in a vicious circle.  
In fact, in the EZ case, De Grauwe and Ji (2015) and Orphanides (2014) 
show that while the ECB policy rate has been dwelling at the ZLB since the 
end of 2012, clear symptoms of monetary restriction have developed as 
witnessed by falling growth of base money, broad monetary aggregates and 
credit, and by higher real interest rates due to deflation. Here we meet a 
crucial issue, specific to the EZ, which will be pivotal in our subsequent 
treatment. The EZ output and inflation gaps are nothing but the result of 
the gaps in each country. The cause of negative gaps at the country level 
should lie in its own IS inequality, i.e. the country's real interest rate 
exceeding the equilibrium real rate. This should be the result of a specific 
spread over the policy rate charged by lenders, net of expected inflation.   
(policy rate + country spread) − (country) expected inflation >  
(country) equilibrium real rate 
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Unless financial markets are perfectly integrated and arbitraged, and all 
countries are equal, each country's interest rate may well be different from 
any other and from the policy rate. It is now well documented that the EZ 
financial markets have undergone a substantial "segmentation" in the 
aftermath of the crisis2. In terms of portfolio theory, asset substitutability 
has fallen both across classes of assets and, more importantly, across 
country denomination.  
Available data provide a clear picture of this problem. Since it is widely 
agreed that bank credit is the primary source of private expenditure in the 
EZ (e.g. Angeloni et al., 2003), let us look at the average interest rate of 
bank loans to non-financial corporations in each EZ country (excluded the 
latest members, Latvia and Lithuania) provided by the ECB.  
  
Figure 1. ECB Main Refinancing Rate, 3-m. Euribor, and average spread of EZ 
country bank interest rates with the Euribor 
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Source: elaborations on ECB Statistical Warehouse, Interest Rate Statistics 
 
To begin with, Figure 1 focuses on the relationship among the ECB policy 
rate (the Main Refinancing Rate), one of the key money market rates for 
banks (the 3-months Euribor) and the average spread between each 
country's bank rate and the Euribor. The data tell two quite different 
stories. On the one hand, apart from the temporary freezing of the 
interbank market in September-October 2008, the ECB has steered the 
Euribor quite effectively. On the other hand, the crisis resulted in a clear 
break of the tendency of the average spread between country bank rates and 
the Euribor to fall: it jumped from 100 to 250 b.p. at the end of 2009 and 
                                            
2 See Abbassi et al. (2014), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2015), Croci Angelini et al. 
(2014). 
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then it rose steadily for four years up to 337 b.p. Hence, country interest 
rates can be, and remain, much higher than the policy rate of the ECB. 
 Figure 2 shows the yearly average observations of the mean and 
standard deviation of the bank interest rates across the EZ countries from 
2003:1 to 2015:3, both in nominal and real terms.  
 
Figure 2. Mean and standard deviation of interest rates of bank loans to non-
financial firms in the EZ countries  
 
Nominal value: year average of monthly observations, 2003:1-2015:3. Real value: adjusted 
for y-y HICP inflation rate 
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse, Interest Rate Statistics 
 
The nominal mean shows a well-known time profile: low and declining in 
the early years of euro-optimisms, skyrocketing as the financial global crisis 
was mounting, plummeting after the first "conventional" ECB interventions, 
then rising again with the sovereign debt crisis, and eventually brought 
again under control by the second wave of ECB measures. What is relevant 
here is the concomitant evolution of the standard deviation. It remained low 
and stable around 50 b.p. until the outbreak of crisis. In spite of the success 
of the ECB in curbing the bank rates on average, the crisis created a 
stepwise surge in the standard deviation which grew by almost 100 b.p. over 
the subsequent years and appears remarkably resistant to the easing of the 
central monetary conditions.  
The average interest rate in real terms by and large follows the same 
pattern as the nominal one, except the movement upwards after 2011 
signalling the deflationary drift in the EZ. As to country differences, it is 
often argued that differences in nominal interest rates may reflect 
differences in inflation rates, so that real interest rates are equalised. 
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However, the data show that the standard deviation of real interest rates 
follows the same upward tendency as that of the nominal ones.  
These data put the QE operation in the EZ in the right perspective. First, 
the ZLB problem in the EZ is that, for a given distribution of country 
spreads and inflation rates, the ECB is unable to further lower the common 
floor of the country nominal interest rates. Second, the ECB faces the ZLB 
problem with its policy rate, but the interest rates in the member countries 
are not at the ZLB. At this point the question is: how can QE achieve what 
the direct control of the policy rate cannot? 
Operationally, QE is a catch-all that covers a number of different 
interventions of the central bank in the money market (e.g. Bernanke and 
Reinhart, 2004; Borio and Disyatat, 2010). However, these interventions do 
have one common feature in that they inject additional base money into the 
system (hence the qualification "quantitative") which is reflected into an 
equal expansion of the central bank's assets (QE is often presented, as for 
example by the ECB, in terms of a target on the latter). Looking at this 
common feature, one may say that QE is nothing but a reincarnation of the 
traditional textbook treatment of monetary policy, the "LM model" for short, 
whereby the central bank controls "the quantity of money" (or, more 
precisely, the monetary base of which total money supply is a multiple).  
Beginning with Krugman (1998) and then Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2004), the leading idea is that QE mainly operates through raising expected 
inflation, which is indeed the preferred rationale for QE in the ECB 
institutional communication. However, what is more opaque in the ECB 
communication, is the transmission mechanism between the announced rate 
of creation of base money and the increase in expected inflation. One 
possibility is of course the monetarist commandment that inflation is always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. But in this case, we would have to 
make the hypothesis that the economy is always at its full employment 
level. If on the other hand the macro-policy framework is the one outlined 
above, the transmission can only go through closing the EZ output gap. This 
is transparent in the institutional communication of the Federal Reserve, 
where, in force of its dual mandate, inflation and output (or unemployment) 
targets go hand in hand. Actually, according to Eggertsson and Woodford's 
(2004) proposal known as "forward guidance", the solution to the problem is 
not QE per se, but the central bank's credible promise to overshoot the 
inflation target. That is to say, the central bank should commit itself to 
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keeping the policy rate unchanged and provide all the money demanded as 
long as necessary to create excess output and inflation. "The expectation 
that a boom will be created later should stimulate spending now, through 
permanent-income and accelerator mechanisms" (p. 77). 
As far as the EZ is concerned, from this point of view we can see that if 
the transmission mechanism from QE to expected and to actual inflation 
should go through the re-equilibration of the country IS functions, then the 
reduction and realignment of country spreads is the necessary intermendiate 
goal. On passing, it is curious to note that while the final goal is in line with 
the ECB mandate, the intermediate one is not (at least in the "hawkish" 
view) because it is country specific, and this may explain why it cannot be 
mentioned officially. In this perspective, the QE mechanism in the EZ also 
takes on a Tobinian flavour, and it comes to overlap with other "non 
conventional measures" that not only do involve the dimension but also the 
composition of asset portfolios of both the central bank and its 
counterparties (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Borio and Dysiatat, 2010). 
The well-known Tobinian mechanism is that, by exchanging some classes of 
assets with money in the counterparties' portfolios, the spread on such 
assets falls so that they become cheaper vehicles for financing expenditure.3  
This requires that each country should receive its own appropriate share of 
QE depending on its local money market conditions. Hence, the LM model 
may still provide a useful framework for analysis. 
 
 
                                            
3 If this is the mechanism, it should also be stressed that the economy should not 
be in the so-called "liquidity trap". The frequent identification of the ZLB with the 
liquidity trap is highly misleading. In the Tobinian framework, that for this aspect 
follows Keynes' General Theory, the liquidity trap is a situation in which the 
central bank is unable to manipulate the relative prices of assets or their spreads 
because the counterparties are ready to exchange whatever amount of assets for 
money. A variant that focuses on banks is that the latter have an "infinite" demand 
for reserves, so that whatever amount of monetary base created by the central 
bank is hoarded instead of being channelled into loans. These phenomena may well 
arise even when the policy rate is still positive (as it was in the EZ in 2012-13), and 
if the economy is in the liquidity trap, QE is, almost by definition, not the solution 
no matter whether the policy rate is positive or zero. In fact, in Keynes's original 
view, the solution to the liquidity trap is not monetary but fiscal policy. This point 
has recently been restated in different theoretical frameworks (e.g. Bossone, 2014) 
or with particular reference to the class of safe assets (the so-called "safety trap" 
presented by Caballero and Fahri, 2014). 
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3. The model 
 Research on the "theory" of QE is in progress. One can mostly find partial 
models of monetary policy or DSGE models with NK foundations with 
"financial frictions" (e.g. Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Curdia and Woodford, 
2011; Schabert, 2014). Each modelling strategy has its own pros and cons in 
view of its aims, and in order to study why and how QE may be the best 
policy response to shocks triggering deflation, the model we propose in this 
section has been designed to serve three main purposes. First, characterise 
QE appropriately as a policy aimed at closing a persistent deflationary gap 
by means of an expansion of the ECB assets, i.e. money supply. Second, take 
into account the specific features of QE in the EZ, namely a two-country 
setup with one single monetary policy and national fiscal policies. Third, 
stylise the main channels of macroeconomic and monetary adjustment, both 
domestically and across countries, that can be found in quantitative models 
for policy analysis (e.g. in't Veld, 2013).  
 To this end, and in a view to balancing micro-detail and macro-
parsimony, we have drawn, in a simple and manageable way, on the 
standard reduced-form New Keynesian macro-policy model consisting of 
three equations: one for the goods market, one for the inflation rate, and one 
for monetary policy. While not exempt from criticisms (e.g. Stiglitz, 2011), 
the New Keynesian framework remains the benchmark for policy analysis of 
the EZ policy institutions. Hence we wish to set ourselves on the same 
ground.  
 We adopt a bottom-up approach, that is, the EZ macroeconomic 
adjustments are the outcome of the adjustments occurring at the level of 
single countries. The EZ variables are the average of the two countries' 
variables. The structure of each country consists of a real block and a 
monetary block. The real block is represented by the standard New 
Keynesian model, i.e. an IS equation augmented with the public and foreign 
sectors, determining gaps from potential output, and a Phillips Curve, 
relating the inflation rate to the output gap.  The monetary block instead 
drops the usual Taylor Rule of interest-rate control and replaces it with an 
LM equation of money demand and supply equilibrium. This change is 
meant to capture the fact that the ECB has switched from the control of the 
interest rate, stuck at the ZLB, to the control of the rate of money creation. 
Thus, how much of money creation trickles down to each country’s money 
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market vis-à-vis money demand determines the country's interest rate as a 
spread over the common rate. 
The economic structures of the countries, represented by the parameters 
of the model and the latent general equilibrium values of the macroeconomic 
variables − such as potential output, the natural interest rate, trend 
inflation, etc. − are alike and remain constant.4 However, we shall 
informally discuss the consequences of structural differences or changes 
where necessary. 
 Since our focus is on policy responses to shocks, the macroeconomic 
adjustments are assumed to occur instantly, and we do not model the 
dynamic behaviour of the adjustment. The key point is the effect of the 
shock on the system, when there is no in-built mechanism of self-adjustment 
except a policy action. Consequently, we run a comparative analysis of 
different policy strategies.5  
 
3.1. The real block 
 We have for each country i = 1, 2, and j = not-i, in each time unit (the 
time subscript is omitted), the following output market-clearing condition, 
or IS equation. Unless otherwise stated, all variables are log-deviations from 
trend or equilibrium values, except interest rates which are expressed as 
spreads above the (zero) ECB policy rate. 
(1) yi  = αp(ci + upi) + αgdi + αxxi           αp + αg + αx = 1 
where yi is the output gap, i.e. the gap between current output and potential 
output, which consists of three components, private domestic demand  ci, the 
net contribution of the public sector to domestic demand, i.e. the 
government's primary deficit di, and the net contribution of the foreign 
sector, i.e. the foreign trade balance xi, each weighed by the respective GDP 
                                            
4 This is a simplifying assumption, common to this class of models, since our focus 
falls on macroeconomic shocks. However we recognize that differences in economic 
structures are important in the EZ, especially after the crisis, which also had 
structural effects, as is testified by the ongoing downward revisions of potential 
output in all countries.  
5 In President Draghi's words "This orientation [of our monetary policy] implies 
that there are types of shocks that are relevant for our price stability assessment, 
and those that are not. The relevant type of shocks are those that are likely to 
persist into the medium-term and affect medium-term inflation expectations" 
(2014b, p.3). We also draw on the earlier literature on policy design on the eve of 
the Monetary Union, such as Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), Beetsma et 
al. (2001).  
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share in steady state (αp, αg, αx). In addition, an exogenous shock to domestic 
private demand upi may arrive randomly. 
 As in the standard IS, we approximate domestic private demand by 
consumption, expressed as a negative function of the deviation of the real 
interest rate from the "natural rate" at which consumption is constant 
intertemporally and potential output is realised. In the standard 
formulation, the real interest rate is represented by the nominal policy rate 
set by the central bank net of expected inflation. As a characteristic feature 
of the EZ, we instead allow the real interest rate to differ across countries, 
by the extent of a spread si of the local nominal rate relative to the common 
policy rate, net of the local expected inflation gap πei. The latter is likewise 
the deviation of expected inflation from the EZ target; we call πei < 0 
expected deflation. Therefore,  
(2) ci = −σ(si − πei)  
where ci is the change in the ratio of present to future consumption.6 
Therefore, the local real interest rate may rise "too high" (si − πei) > 0 
relative to the constant natural rate as a result of a positive spread and/or 
expected deflation, so that consumption is shifted from the present to the 
future according to its elasticity −σ.  
 Investment is obviously important and a few considerations are in order. 
It is well known that it is the most volatile macro-variable, and that it 
produced the bulk of the real contraction after the financial shock (Hall, 
2012).  However, as shown by e.g. Casares and McCallum (2006), in this 
class of models deviations of investment from steady state (pure capital 
replacement) are sensitive to the same variable as consumption, via Tobin's 
q, net of the adjustment cost component. Hence equation (2) may be 
extended to include, at least in part, the investment component of private 
demand. The typical high volatility of investment relative to consumption 
may be related to Tobin's q connection with stock market valuation (see 
Grossi and Tamborini, 2012), and this may be captured by the exogenous 
component up. We also wish to acknowledge that more recent advances in 
modelling financial frictions show that both consumption and investment, or 
at least some classes of households and firms, turn out to be constrained by, 
and hence highly sensitive to, their current income and revenue streams. 
                                            
6 Our derivation of the consumption function is explained in a note in the 
Appendix. 
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This reintroduces the traditional Keynesian dependence of private demand 
also on current GDP. By ignoring this component, and concentrating on the 
real interest rate, we set the stage for a more "friendly" transmission 
mechanism of both shocks and monetary policy interventions, which means 
that in reality shocks may have greater impact, and monetary policy less 
impact, than implied by the model. As will be seen, our single "shock 
amplifier" is the persistence of deflation expectations, which is in fact the 
core concern of the ECB.  
As to the public sector, the public primary deficit di  is the deviation from 
its steady-state value, which is set to zero. This is the net contribution of the 
public sector being the difference between additional demand created by 
expenditure for goods and services and its subtraction due to taxation. 
Following the EZ policy framework (e.g. EU Commission, 2013), we 
distinguish between a discretionary and a cyclical component of the primary 
deficit. For simplicity we attribute the cyclical component to the sole tax 
revenue (i.e. we ignore automatic cyclical expenditure such as 
unemployment benefits). Assuming that the government keeps a constant 
revenue/GDP rate τ, the actual revenue deviates form its steady-state level 
proportionally to the output gap, τyi. Then we treat the discretionary 
component as a change in public expenditure, or fiscal shock ugi.  
(3) di = ugi − τyi 
 Governments face two budget constraints. One concerns the so-called 
"structural budget", i.e. the budget net of the cyclical component, which in 
the recent reform of the Treaties should be "zero or slightly positive". This 
implies that ugi < 0 as far as permanent expenditures are concerned. The 
other is the original limit of 3% for the overall deficit/GDP ratio. This 
implies that ugi can (or should) be different from zero as far as transitory 
(countercyclical) expenditures are concerned. Let d i be the difference 
between the deficit consistent with the 3% constraint and the current 
deficit. Then, ugi < d i + τyi. Yet ugi affects yi. To take this into account let kg 
be the fiscal multiplier (see below, section 2.3) and  y'i the current output 
gap prior to ugi, so that yi = y'i + kgugi. Therefore, 
(4) ugi < (d i + τy'i)(1 − τkg)−1 
If say the current deficit is zero and an ongoing output gap y'i < 0 cuts the 
fiscal revenue by 2% of GDP, the maximal fiscal stimulus can be 1% of GDP 
corrected for (1 − τkg)−1, i.e. the self-financing of the fiscal stimulus by means 
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of  additional fiscal revenue. The larger τ and kg, the larger ugi can be7. Note 
however that this constraint is asymmetric. As long as (d i + τy'i) > 0, the 
government may wish to enact a fiscal stimulus, whereas if (d i + τy'i) < 0, 
the government must activate a fiscal contraction to keep the overall deficit 
within the 3% limit. As is well known, the deficit constraint has an in-built 
procyclical mechanism precisely when recessions are worse. 
 The foreign trade balance xi  consists of two components, intra and extra-
EZ, with respective shares of θ and 1-θ. Intra-EZ trade depends on the 
change in the intra-EZ real exchange rate (πj − πi), given by the relative 
inflation gaps in the two countries, and on the business cycle in the two 
countries (yj − yi). As to extra-EZ trade, we assume that world prices and 
output remain on trend, so that the only relevant variable is the change in 
the extra-EZ real exchange rate, given by the rate of change of the euro 
exchange rate ε (ε > 0 denotes depreciation) vis-à-vis the local inflation gap. 
We assume unit elasticity of all the trade components with the relevant 
variables.  Therefore,  
(5) xi = θ((πj − πi) + (yj − yi)) + (1 − θ)((ε − πi) − yi)    
The euro exchange rate is driven by (deviations from) uncovered interest 
parity with the rest of the world (ROW), i.e. 
(6) ε =  ϕ(rw − r  + εe) 
where r is (the change in) the EZ policy rate, rw is the equivalent for the 
ROW and εe is the expected depreciation rate of the euro. Thus, the euro 
depreciates to the extent that rw + εe > r, where ϕ measures the responsi-
veness of world capital movements to the interest-rate differential (for 
simplicity, we set ϕ = 1).  As to εe, we adopt the "PPP view" according to 
which exchange-rate expectations are driven by the inflation  differential π − 
πw ; this is zero when inflation is on trend in the EZ and the ROW. In a 
world at the ZLB, differences of level and change in the policy rates are 
negligible, rw ≈ r ≈ 0. Assuming that world inflation remains on trend, πw = 
0, the euro exchange rate is fully driven by the inflation gap in the EZ, ε = π, 
that is deflation π < 0 makes the euro appreciate, and vice versa. 
 We now move to the supply side of the economies, represented by the 
relationship between the output gap and the deviations of inflation from 
trend. According to the standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve, that 
                                            
7 According to the EZ parameter values introduced in 2.3 below, this correction 
factor amounts to 1.24.   
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assumes monopolistic competition with sticky prices in the form of a random 
subset of firms that do not adjust prices in the face of excess demand, the 
current inflation gap is determined by its expected value and the current 
output gap, i.e. in our terms, 
(7) πi = βπei + ηyi + uπi 
where β is a discount factor, η is the elasticity of price changes to output 
gaps and uπi is a white-noise random shock. The rational expectation (RE) of 
the inflation gap is therefore the statistical expected value of (7): 
(8) πei = E(πi) = E( )1 iy
η
−β
  
where E(⋅) denotes the unbiased statistical expected value. Clearly, in this 
setup, the RE of the inflation gap is uniquely conditioned by the statistical 
expected value of output gaps. The key implication is that πei is zero only if 
the price setters can rationally expect the output gap to be zero. As shown 
by Woodford (2003, ch. 3), the standard Taylor rule, defined on the natural 
rate of interest, on deviations of output from potential and of inflation from 
target, ensures that the output gap is zero when inflation is on target. This 
provides the anchor for the trend of inflation prevailing in general 
equilibrium, so that πi can be gauged as a reversible fluctuation around the 
central bank's target, which supports the RE that πei = E(πi) = 0 8.  
 This RE equilibrium can be upset as the agents cease to have a rational 
basis to believe that E(yi) = 0. To see this point in detail, let yei denote a 
generic expectation of the output gap and substitute it for E(yi) in equation 
(8). To the extent that yei  ≠ 0, the actual inflation gap becomes 
(9) 1(1 ) ei i iy y u− ππ = η + ηβ −β +  
and if yei  < 0, the actual inflation gap takes a negative drift. Therefore, the 
concern for a persistent, expectation-driven, deflationary bias in the 
economy has little to do with exogenous shocks to the Phillips Curve and 
much to do with the entrenchment of the belief that the output gap will 
remain negative. To pin down this phenomenon with observable data in a 
simple way, let the belief yei be the expected value of the output gap 
                                            
8 The same result can be obtained by deriving the policy rate rule from 
minimization of a loss function defined on output and inflation gaps (Clarida et al., 
1999) 
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persisting with probability p or reverting with probability 1−p, i.e. yei = pyi.9 
As a result we can write   
(10) πei = ωyi 
with ω ≡ pη(1− β)−1 measuring the weight of persistence expectations (PE).10  
The actual inflation gap thus becomes  
(11) πi = πy yi + uπi 
where πy ≡ η + βω.  
Note that, as yei = E(yi) = 0 supports the zero-gaps RE equilibrium πei = 
E(πi) = 0, so a persistent output gap, such that eventually yei = E(yi) = yi 
with p→1, supports another, nonzero-gaps, RE equilibrium where πy ≡ 
η/(1−β), and πei = E(πi) = πy yi. So long as 0 < p < 1, the economy is not in RE 
equilibrium (πei ≠ E(πi)); however, we shall allow for this possibility by using 
(10) as the equation of the expectation formation, so that we can examine 
two scenarios: the "normal" one, when ω = 0 and the ECB should prevent the 
formation of nonzero-gaps expectations  by consistently realising E(y) = 0, 
and the  "persistence" one, where ω > 0 and the ECB should curb existing 
PE. 
  Substituting equations from (2) to (11) into (1) we obtain the following 
bilateral11 form of the IS equation: 
(12) yi = [− σ'si + αpupi + αgugi − αxuπi + α'x(yj  + πj) + α"xε)]Ωy 
where σ' ≡ αpσ, α'x ≡ αxθ, α"x ≡ αx(1−θ) and Ωy = [1 + αgτ + αx(1 + η) − 
ω(σ'−βαx)]−1 
 We have thus a detailed account of (changes in) the various internal and 
external variables and shocks that may generate e.g. a negative output gap 
under the normal condition that Ωy > 0. First come four domestic variables: 
a positive spread of the local nominal interest rate on the common policy 
rate si > 0 that reduces private demand, other exogenous shocks to private 
demand upi < 0, a fiscal restriction ugi < 0, an inflationary shift of the 
Phillips Curve uπi > 0 that worsens global external competitiveness. Then 
come the two business cycle variables of the other country, i.e. negative 
output and inflation gaps, yj < 0, πj < 0; both variables work through the 
intra-EZ trade channel.  Finally there comes the rate of appreciation of the 
                                            
9 Hence 1-p can be interpreted as a measure of the confidence in the central bank's 
control over the business cycle. 
10 In applied quantitative macro-models β is set close to 1. Note therefore that even 
a small persistence probability p may magnify ω substantially. 
11 That is, a quasi-reduced form of yi where yj appears explicitly. 
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euro ε < 0 (i.e. the expected deflation at the EZ level) which works through 
the extra-EZ trade channel.  Given the respective parameters, the impact of 
these events is larger the smaller is the magnitude of the common 
denominator (or the larger the respective "multiplier" of each shock).12 
 
3.2. The monetary block 
 In normal times, the policy rate set by the ECB affects the demand side 
of each country via the real interest rate, while the inflation target provides 
the anchor for the expected trend inflation. However, here we have to deal 
with "special times" in which the policy rate is at the ZLB, and the central 
bank deliberately turns the Taylor Rule off and shifts to QE with the 
unconditional objective of closing the inflation gap. We should model this 
new monetary policy stance from the point of view of each country in the EZ.
 In the first place, we need to introduce the money market of each 
country.13 A variety of microfoundations are available. For the reasons 
discussed in section 2, we find it suitable a Tobinian foundation on portfolio 
theory (e.g. Tobin, 1980, 1982; see Appendix A2)14. Key to this approach is 
the degree of substitutability between money and assets and across different 
assets depending on outstanding stocks, their riskiness, and risk 
preferences. Its major limitation is that there is no explicit role for bank 
intermediaries, which are clearly crucial in the monetary transmission 
mechanism, particularly in the EZ (Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Schabert, 
2014). However, the portfolio approach neatly focuses on one of the critical 
points of QE: namely the extent to which, for a given configuration of risks, 
exchanges of assets for liquidity with the central bank are transmitted to 
the interest rate.  What configuration is most accurate is a thorny empirical 
                                            
12 The factors that decrease Ωy, and hence smooth the impact of shocks, are (i) a large GDP 
share of the public sector and/or a high revenue rate (αgτ) (automatic fiscal stabilization is 
strong), (ii) a large GDP share of foreign trade αx  (a larger part of the shock is absorbed by 
imports) combined with high inflation/output elasticity η (the deflationary effect of the 
shock raises exports; this is also called “the good deflation”). By contrast, expected deflation 
persistence ω > 0 has an ambivalent effect. On the one hand it amplifies the "good 
deflation" effect via exports; on the other, it depresses domestic demand via higher real 
interest rate: this is “the bad deflation”, or Fisher effect.  
13 The insertion of the money market in the New Keynesian model is discussed in 
detail by Woodford (2008).  
14 See also Duca and Muellbauer (2013) and Blanchard et al. (2015) for recent 
applications 
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issue, but as discussed in section 2, it is now largely believed that, whereas 
the pre-crisis regime of the EZ would approach "perfect substitutability", 
after the crisis the EZ capital market has become significantly "segmented", 
which we translate into the  assumptions that (i) there is a segmentation 
between within-country and cross-country substitution, and (ii) that assets 
are imperfect substitutes across countries. Like Blanchard et al. (2015), we 
assume that money demand in each country is expressed by domestic agents 
who seek to optimise their money holdings vis-à-vis interest-bearing 
domestic assets in view of their non-financial transactions. Besides there 
are EZ "global investors" who seek pure financial returns by optimising 
their portfolios of assets from different countries, which gives rise to intra-
EZ capital movements.15  
 Therefore, we first have a money demand equation for each country such 
that the rate of change in money demand results from 
(13) mdi = πi + my yi − mssi + umi 
The inflation and output gaps, πi and yi, trigger excess demand for 
transaction balances with positive elasticity. The interest rate on domestic 
assets (i.e. the country spreads on the common policy rate, si) is the 
opportunity cost of money, and it triggers substitution between money and 
the domestic assets according to the semi-elasticity −ms. Finally, money 
demand can be shifted by exogenous shock umi. Portfolio theory shows that 
money-asset substitutability is poorer (si is smaller) when risk and/or risk 
aversion are higher. In turn, these conditions are more likely when the 
underlying asset stock is high (see Appendix A2).  
 As to money supply, each country in a monetary union has two sources of 
it (e.g. Goodhart, 1989; Tamborini, 2001), that can be specified as follows: 
(14) msi = bi  + µi 
The first source is the share of the union's money stock that is distributed 
by way of intra-union payment imbalances bi, so that surplus countries gain 
money to the expenses of deficit countries. As to extra-union imbalances, in 
the EZ they are pooled together by the ECB and affect its stock of official 
reserves and (possibly) money supply16.  
                                            
15 For simplicity we exclude non-EZ assets. 
16 In practice, being on a free float, this component is almost negligible. 
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Intra-union payments are the result of the current account (which for 
simplicity we identify with the trade component only) and capital 
movements i.e. 
(15) bi = θ((πj − πi) + (yj − yi)) + bs(si − sj) 
The trade account has already been defined above, whereas capital 
movements are driven towards one country or the other depending on the 
interest-rate differential (i.e. the respective spread over the common policy 
rate) given the degree of cross-country asset substitution measured by the 
parameter bs. If they are perfect substitute, we are in the case of "perfect 
capital mobility" in the Mundell-Fleming tradition. Instead, given risk 
aversion, assets from different countries are imperfect substitutes 
depending on differences in relative riskiness and outstanding stocks which 
may lower the magnitude of bs (see Appendix A2).17 Notice that here the 
capital market operates in a "normal" situation in which a higher spread 
signals a higher risk premium, but it attracts capital inflows and does not 
trigger a capital flight to safety. 
 The second source of money supply is direct borrowing in the union's 
money market (and lending to the economy) by the country's banking 
system, µi. This variable is a simple and straightforward way to capture the 
role of shocks emanating from the banking system. In the aggregate, Σbi = 0, 
and Σµi = µ, where µ is the rate of money creation in the EZ.18 
 At this point, we are in a position to examine how the money market 
conditions affect the country spreads. Let us compute the value of si that 
satisfies the money market equilibrium mdi = msi. The result is  
(16) si = [(my + θ)yi + (1+θ)πi − θ(yj + πj) + bssj + (umi − µi)]Ωs 
where Ωs = [bs + ms]−1 
Each country spread depends on the output and inflation gaps of both 
countries, the spread of the other country, and its own money demand and 
                                            
17 In addition, cross-country substitutability may be further impaired to the extent 
that international investors discounts specific cross-border risks or displays "home 
bias" (i.e. risk aversion is higher or lower for assets issued in specific countries) 
18 Note that Σµi = µ can be read bi-directionally. From the right to the left it 
indicates how the money creation activated by the ECB is allocated to the single 
countries. This reading is appropriate to QE and we shall use it subsequently. 
However, in "conventional times", when the ECB sets the terms of borrowing in the 
money market and stands by, we can read from left to right the total amount of 
money creation due to each country's banking system, or the extent of endogenous 
money creation.   
 18
supply shocks. The quantitative impact of these variables on the spread 
mainly depends on two parameters, ms and bs, which respectively measure 
asset-substitutability within and across countries. The change in the spread 
is greater the smaller they are, i.e. with poorer substitutability. All this 
supports the concern that high-risk and high-debt (private and/or public) 
countries have a spread strongly sensitive to shocks.  
As far as the domestic variables are concerned, it may be argued that the 
positive correlation of the spread with the business cycle (yi, πi) via excess 
demand for transaction balances is no longer regarded as important, at least 
quantitatively (but see Calza et al., 2001; Beyer, 2009, and Appendix A3). 
However, equation (16) shows that the business cycle also operates through 
the balance-of-payments (BOP) channel of money supply. A buoyant 
economy, with yj and πj larger than abroad, develops a negative current 
account and looses money thus pushing the spread upwards to the extent 
required by residents to meet their demand for money (parameter ms) and 
by global investors to finance the current account deficit (parameter bs). The 
output and inflation gaps of the other country operate in the opposite 
direction. Indeed, current account imbalances across the EZ have drawn 
great attention as a critical factor for macroeconomic as well as financial 
instability (e.g. Gros, 2013).  
The transmission mechanism of the foreign spread goes through capital 
movements and the key parameter is just bs. This transmission channel is 
stronger when bs is high, which may explain the remarkable compression 
and alignment of spreads when sovereign bonds were regarded as almost 
riskless perfect substitutes as well as the opposite phenomenon as the EZ 
capital market has become segmented and bs has fallen.  
 Let us now discuss monetary shocks in some detail. In this type of model 
money demand shocks may be an important source of macroeconomic 
instability, and they may capture phenomena that have played a role during 
the development of the financial crisis, such as a sudden surge in liquidity 
preference umi > 0 that pushes the spread up. However, money-security 
substitution also implies that the money market equilibrium should be 
consistent with the security market equilibrium, and, by Walras Law, 
excess demand in the money market should be equal to excess supply in the 
security market, and vice versa (Tobin, 1969).  For our purposes, we focus on 
public bonds as representative of the security market. Therefore, excess 
supply of public bonds, due to a government deficit, should be matched by 
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excess demand for money, or di = umi. We can thus deal with the critical role 
of the public sector. 
In the first place, we see that the local spread is increasing in the 
country's public deficit, a fundamental assumption at the roots of the EZ 
design. Inspection of the relevant parameters shows that the effect of the 
public deficit once again depends on the asset-substitutability parameters 
ms and bs. The effect is greater the smaller they are, i.e. with poorer 
substitutability. An additional effect of the public deficit to be expected from 
the real block arises to the extent that it sustains a positive output gap with 
an increase in the demand for transaction balances, and a decrease of 
money supply through a worse balance of payments. In the second place, to 
the extent that the spreads are correlated, the local spread is also increasing 
in the other country's public deficit, another concern that has shaped the EZ 
design.  
 Money supply shocks are particularly important as they are the vehicle of 
the transmission of central operations to the countries or, from the other 
viewpoint, the effect of changes in the financing ability/willingness of the 
domestic banking system. We see that these shocks have the same and 
symmetric effect as the demand ones in both countries.  This fact has two 
interesting consequences. The first is that an increase in local money supply 
is more effective on the spread precisely when it is needed, i.e. when si is 
large because ms is small (domestic asset substitutability is low) and issuing 
new liabilities to finance expenditure is more costly. The second is the case 
in which µi = di, i.e.  money financing of the public deficit with null effect on 
the spread. Note that the cross-border transmission channel now operates 
for the good of the other country too. In the EZ countries this operation can 
only be engineered by way of the banking system's access to the central 
money supply, which is by and large what happened between 2012 and 2014 
thanks to the extraordinary liquidity operations of the ECB such as LTRO.  
 
3.3 The three equations at the country level 
 We can now  consider the equations of the three key variables found 
above as the following single system that we reproduce here for convenience: 
   yi = [− σ'si + αpupi + αgugi − αxuπi + α'x(yj  + πj) + α"xε)]Ωy 
(17) πi = πy yi + uπi 
   si = [(my + θ)yi + (1+θ)πi − θ(yj + πj) + bssj + (ugi − µi)]Ωs 
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Note that this is a reformulation of the standard New Keynesian three-
equations system where the LM equation for the spread si replaces the 
Taylor Rule, and the rate of domestic money creation µi replaces the interest 
rate as a policy tool. Of course, the single country has no control over µi, 
which in fact depends on the rate of money creation decided by the ECB and 
the share of it that flows into the country. In addition, a prominent role is 
played by the concomitant business cycle position of the other country and 
by the extra-EZ trade channel.  
The quantitative dimension of the parameters of the three equations are 
crucial since they provide the foundation of the whole QE policy, as we shall 
see in detail.  Therefore, for the sake of concreteness, we have sought to 
provide a tentative quantification based on available direct or indirect 
sources (see Appendix A2). This is done just for illustrative purposes, with 
no claim of rigorous measurement. The results are reported below, for the 
base case in which there are no expectations of persistent output gap, and 
the case of a 5% probability of persistence in parentheses underneath. 
  yi = − 0.127si + 0.636upi + 0.523ugi − 0.035uπi + 0.023(yj  + πj) + 0.012ε 
       (0.133)     (0.663)      (0.545)      (0.036)      (0.024)              (0.013) 
(18) πi = 0.086yi + uπi 
       (0.515) 
  si = 1.245(yi + πi) − 0.495(yj + πj) + 0.4sj + 0.75(ugi − µi) 
  
 To begin with the IS function, it should first be noted that the common 
multiplier Ωy is less than 1 (0.872 in the base case) indicating the shock-
absorbing capacity of the system (see above section 2.1 and fn. 12). As to 
fiscal shocks, their parameter is in line with the pre-crisis consensus that 
set fiscal multipliers in the range between 0.5 and 1.19 The PC function has 
quite a small output elasticity, as is standard in estimated or calibrated 
New Keynesian models. The LM function shows that the country spread is 
highly sensitive to all shocks. This matches a well-known empirical 
regularity about the volatility of interest rates (see also the figures in 
section 2). Our model (see above 3.2 and Appendix A2) captures one main 
                                            
19 As is well known, the pre-crisis consensus on fiscal multipliers has been 
challenged by a number of empirical studies pointing to a large upgrading of 
estimates well above 1 or even 2. Here the difference with the traditional 
Keynesian multiplier typically greater than 1, is the absence of components of 
private expenditure directly dependent on GDP discussed previously.. 
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reason for high sensitivity, namely poor asset substitutability, reflected in 
the relative small magnitude of the parameters of the LM function found in 
the crisis period (see Appendix A3) such that the common multiplier Ωs is 
barely below unity (0.75), i.e. portfolio adjustments provide little shock 
absorption. The other side of the coin is that the cross-country transmission 
of spreads is of limited extent (0.4). Combined with poor asset 
substitutability, the quantitative importance of the intra-EZ BP channel of 
the spread is confirmed. A large part of the sizeable increase of the spread 
during a domestic boom is due to the deterioration of the BP (contraction of 
domestic money supply vis-à-vis increase in the demand for transaction 
balances) whereas the entire decrease of the spread triggered by a foreign 
boom is due to the improvement of the BP (expansion of domestic money 
supply). Parallely, exogenous shocks to domestic money supply have an 
important impact on the local spread. 
 It can be seen that the introduction of even a small probability assigned 
to persistence of output/inflation gaps makes a nontrivial difference for the 
IS and PC functions. The IS function is affected, becoming more sensitive to 
all shocks, because its common multiplier is amplified (from 0.872 to 0.908), 
while the PC output elasticity rises substantially. For a given recessionary 
shock, the negative inflation gap grows much larger.   
The reduced form of the three-equation systems of the two countries can 
conveniently be expressed in matrix form as follows 
(19) [yi, πi, si]' = A[upi, ugi, uπi, ∆uπ, µi, ε]' 
for i = 1,2. A is the coefficient matrix. Hence, each country's endogenous 
variables are the result of both domestic and foreign shocks as well as of the 
common exogenous represented by the rate of change of the euro ε. Note 
that the PC shocks uπi  are split into two parts: uπi stands for the shock in 
the single country i and its coefficient measures its effect through the extra-
EZ trade; ∆uπ = uπ1 − uπ2 and its coefficient (of equal and opposite sign in the 
two countries) measures its effect through the intra-EZ trade. This is an 
important "detail" highlighted by the model. In fact, gains and losses of 
intra-EZ trade are a zero-sum game, so that a deflationary shock in country 
1 gains more intra-EZ trade to the extent that it is not matched by an equal 
shock in country 2. If the PC shocks are symmetric, ∆uπ = 0, each country 
only gains (or loses) extra-EZ trade. This "detail" clarifies the widespread 
argument that pursuing deflationary policies all across the EZ is a self-
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defeating strategy that can only benefit each country by way of the extra-EZ 
trade channel, which is known to be much smaller than the intra-EZ one. 
 System (19) also contains an important information for the issue under 
discussion. In principle, for any exogenous shock there exists an optimal 
decentralised policy response, either monetary or fiscal, i.e. a pair µ*i and/or 
u*gi such that πi = 0. Therefore, the centralised policy response by the ECB 
should rest on the premise that the decentralised one is unfeasible. On the 
monetary side, the national banking systems may be unable, or unwilling, to 
borrow from the ECB at the given policy rate so as to expand domestic 
money supply as much as necessary. On the fiscal side, governments may be 
inhibited, or unwilling, to activate the necessary fiscal stimuli (see the 
budget constraint (4)).   
4. QE at work 
4.1. The ECB and the EZ economy as a whole 
 In order to introduce the ECB's behaviour we should now move to the 
EZ level. The correct road towards the EZ level starts from the reduced form 
of the three-equations systems of each country (19). In fact, the ECB should 
know and exploit the exact structure of the transmission mechanism of QE, 
by which we mean the whole set of country equations and their parameters 
resulting in the EZ economy as a whole. Now, upon averaging the country-
level endogenous and exogenous variables, we obtain the following EZ 
system in matrix format (EZ variables are denoted by non-indexed symbols)  
(20) [y, π, s]' = B[up, ug, uπ, µ]'  
The three endogenous EZ variables result to be determined by the 
average shocks to aggregated demand, fiscal policy, inflation gaps, and by 
the rate of money creation µ. For the reason explained above, the intra-EZ 
trade effect of each country's uπi shocks cancel out, so that uπ only affects the 
extra-EZ trade.  As to the exchange rate, we have assumed in the model 
that it is driven by the EZ inflation gap, i.e. ε = π , so that it, too, is 
endogenised. The coefficient matrix B conveys important information. 
 First, substantial structural uncertainty exists in that the signs of all 
coefficients are ambiguous. This uncertainty arises as a consequence of two 
phenomena. One is that each shock has both a direct impact on the 
correspondent endogenous variable and an indirect effect via the 
concomitant adjustment of the other endogenous variables. For instance, a 
negative demand shock up < 0 affects the output gap y directly and the 
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spread  s indirectly. The direct effect generates a negative output gap, which 
also reduces the spread. The final effect remains negative on both y and s if 
its direct impact on y is larger than the recovery of output due to the 
concomitant fall of s. A positive fiscal shock ug > 0 raises both y and s if the 
"Keynesian effects" prevails, i.e. the positive direct impact on y  is larger 
than the negative "crowding out" effect due to the rise in s. A deflationary 
shock results in a negative inflation gap if the concomitant positive 
competitiveness effect on the output gap does not prevail.  
The second phenomenon that generates sign uncertainty is due to 
reciprocal spillovers. In fact, two mechanisms are at work behind the 
determination of the EZ variables. One is the simple aggregation of 
domestic responses to domestic shocks, the other is the aggregation of the 
spillover effects. This important information would be lost if the EZ were 
considered as a single economy. To see this, start again from each country's 
IS (12) and suppose that a slump occurs in country j, yj < 0, while nothing 
happens in country i. Then the EZ output loss will not just be yj/2 but 
larger, owing to the reciprocal spillovers between the two countries. The 
same occurs with shocks to spreads, as can be seen by means of the LM 
equation (16): an increase in the spread of country j also raises the spread of 
country i through the BoP channel, so that the increase of the average 
spread is magnified. In general, these reciprocal spillovers act as amplifiers 
of the sheer average of exogenous shocks at the country level; therefore, 
their relevant parameters should be sufficiently small in order to prevent 
anomalous effects of the shocks. 
Assuming that the indirect effects and that the spillover effects are 
sufficiently small, the coefficient signs are those reported in system (21). In 
parentheses we also report the figures obtained with our empirical 
parameters, which are indeed consistent with this assumption. Since the 
expectations of persistent deflation (output gap) play an important role in 
the ECB communication, system (21) reports figures for this case.   
 
(21) 
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4.2. The mechanics of QE and its policy implications 
 System (21) may be useful to understand why QE may be necessary in 
the first place. The EZ inflation gap can be negative after a private demand 
fall up < 0, a fiscal contraction ug < 0, and/or because of a direct deflationary 
shock uπ < 0. Shocks to private demand have a large impact on both output 
and inflation gaps, though the average spread is reduced in parallel. 
Commensurate (about twice the shock) coordinated fiscal stimuli would be 
the most effective response for correcting both recession and deflation; yet, if 
compatible with fiscal rules, their drawback is a substantial rise in the 
average spread, which may be detrimental for countries with high debt. 
With fiscal stimuli tightly constrained, generalised deflationary shocks 
across countries reduce the average spread but they may nonetheless put 
monetary policy under stress as they give limited relief to recession and 
magnify deflation substantially. Indeed, QE appears as the weapon of last 
resort. Notably, QE has a substantial effect on the average spread whereas 
the effect on the output gap  is of lesser magnitude, and the final effect on π 
is rather small (indeed, the transmission mechanism is µ→ s → y → π). The 
ultimate reason is that the standard quantification of the slope of the PC is 
in the range of few centesimal points, although, as previously seen, the 
persistence expectations raise it substantially. The immediate policy 
implication is that QE should be activated on a large scale.  
 In this setup, the ECB has the single instrument µ for one (unconditional) 
official target: close the negative inflation gap π. In principle, this appears to 
be a problem with a well-defined solution. Let us work it out in detail with 
reference to the empirical coefficient values in system (21). For each of the 
shocks up, ug, and uπ,  we can compute the optimal µ*, i.e the rate of money 
creation that sets the inflation gap to zero, and its effect on the remaining 
endogenous variables (see Table 1). In all cases, a positive µ* is warranted, 
with three qualifications. First, the quantitative responses are different, and 
the ECB should identify the type of shocks originating the inflation gap. 
Second, the more the PC is flat, the larger µ* should be; hence, it may be 
comforting to see that in the presence of deflationary expectations, which 
make the PC steeper, QE is both necessary and more efficient. Third, apart 
from quantitative differences of QE, the overall macroeconomic effects are 
also notably different for different shocks. 
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Table 1. Optimal µ* and its effects on the other endogenous variables (p=0.05) 
 up<0 ug<0 uπ<0 
µ* 5.2 2.3  9.6 
y(µ*)  0.0 0.0  1.9 
s(µ*) -7.5 -6.2 -13.6 
 
  If QE reacts to a private demand contraction, the output gap is also 
closed whereas the average spread is reduced but not completely eliminated. 
This outcome is entirely consistent with the logic of targeting both the 
actual and the expected inflation gap. If instead QE is in reaction to a 
deflationary shock, the output gap should become positive as long as the 
shock is not reversed. This is essentially the "overshooting" policy strategy 
envisaged by Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) (see above) in a single 
snapshot. 
4.3. Asymmetric shocks and the need for fiscal adjustment 
 The previous paragraph proved that a QE programme of the appropriate 
size can in general succeed in closing the aggregate output gap. Yet, 
remember that what surfaces at the EZ level is the result of what is going 
on at the country level. We shall see that two stumbling blocks lie in the 
way of QE success at the country level:  
• the degree of correlation of shocks across countries (we denote with cji ∈ 
[−1, 1] the extent of a shock in country j given a shock in country i) 
• the distribution of money creation between the countries (we denote with φi 
the share of country i in the rate of money creation)  
 Even in our (most favourable) case in which the countries are structurally 
equal, the EZ average outcome exactly reflects the country-level outcomes 
only if  
• the relevant shock is symmetric, cji = 1 
• each country receives the same share of aggregate money creation, φi = 
0.5 
 We can verify this statement by considering as an example the case of a 
private demand shock, and  comparing the outcomes of the centralised QE 
in Table 1, with the optimal decentralised QE for each country, i.e. the 
values of µ*i that sets πi = 0, in Table 2. The second column shows the 
outcomes for a symmetric shock (c21 = 1), the third column for an 
asymmetric shock in country 1 (c21 = 0) 
 
 26
Table 2. Optimal µi* and their effects on the endogenous variables  
in each country (up1 = -1%) 
 c21 = 1 c21 = 0 
µ1*  2.6   6.8 
y1(µ1*)   0.0   0.0 
s1(µ1*) −7.5 −7.6 
µ2*   2.6 −4.2 
y2(µ2*)   0.0   0.0 
s2(µ2*)  −7.5  0.1 
 
 In the case of symmetric negative shock it is confirmed that the 
centralised solution is equivalent to the decentralised one, provided that the 
aggregate QE is equally split between the two countries. But in the case of 
asymmetric shock in country 1, the decentralised solution is quite different 
from the previous one. Country 1 needs much larger monetary expansion, 
whereas country 2 needs monetary contraction. The fall in the spread 
should be slightly larger in country 1 vis-à-vis a slight increase in country 2. 
Consequently, as shown by Table 3, the centralised solution with equal 
distribution of money creation is no longer optimal at the country level. 
 
Table 3. Optimal centralised solution and its effects at the country level 
(asymmetric shock up1 = −1%, c21 = 0, φ1= φ2 = 0.5)  
µ*  2.6 µ1    1.3 µ2 1.3 
π(µ*)  0.0 π1(µ*) −0.2 π2(µ*)  0.2 
y(µ*)  0.0 y1(µ*) −0.4 y2(µ*)   0.4 
s(µ*) −3.8 s1(µ*) −4.4 s2(µ*) −3.1 
 
 In the first place, the asymmetric shock in country 1 entails that the 
average EZ shock is just one half of it. Then, the equal distribution of µ* 
between the two countries implies that country 1 is underadjusted and 
country 2 is overadjusted. In particular, note that the optimal stabilisation 
of π and y at the EZ level hides residual negative output and inflation gaps 
in country 1 exactly matched by positive gaps in country 2, while the spread 
falls too little in country 1 and too much in country 2.   
 Pragmatically, it may be argued that the centralised QE is better than 
nothing, for otherwise both countries would suffer from worse inflation and 
output gaps. However, it is important to know that the possibility, and 
necessity, for the ECB to activate QE is not sufficient to guarantee the 
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complete success of the operation at the country level. In order to unbundle 
the average EZ variables and obtain the desired results at the country level, 
the ECB should know and exploit a huge amount of local information (in 
particular the extent of local shocks) and control the country distribution of 
the aggregate money creation. Both requirements may be hardly feasible in 
practice, but, more importantly, they may be objected as being in contrast 
with the ECB mandate that prevents ad hoc monetary policy actions for 
specific countries. In fact, the ECB has announced that it will control for the 
country distribution of QE in consideration of each country's share in the 
ECB capital. Yet this criterion is utterly unrelated to the optimality of 
money creation at the country level that we have seen above20. It may well 
be the case that more money creation will flow where it is needed the least.  
Therefore, non trivial problems of consistency arise for the correct design of 
the QE programme. 
 In the case of undesirably unbalanced outcomes at the country level, the 
intervention of  last resort is fiscal accommodation. This can consistently be 
obtained from the country system (19). With our parameterisation and a 
private demand shock, the fiscal response in each country that drives its 
own inflation and output gaps to zero, given the country distribution of QE, 
looks like the following 
(22) u*gi = −1.751upi  − 0.15upj + 0.162ugj  − 0.435µi − 0.289µj 
 The first important feature to note is that we are in the presence of a 
coordinated solution. The fiscal response of each country should also take 
into account the fiscal response, the demand shock, and the QE share of the 
other. Note the positive parameter of ugj in the equation: it draws attention 
to the fact that the fiscal stimulus in country j may have a negative spillover 
onto country i, so that the latter's fiscal stimulus should be enlarged. In this 
model, the negative spillover is due to the rise of the spreads in both 
countries. Hence, the negative side of fiscal accommodation to QE may be 
that the spreads rise instead of falling.21 This case warns that the general 
                                            
20 Notice in addition that the "country-specific" QE takes the form of national bond 
purchase, but nothing guarantees that the owners of those bonds are also residents 
of the country, so that money creation may not happen there. 
21 In this model spreads are highly sensitive to fiscal shocks because both countries 
are parameterized with the same low money-asset substitutability. If one of the 
countries is instead in a normal regime of (high) substitutability and enjoys a 
larger latitude of fiscal expansion, the negative spillover onto the other country 
may be limited or even reversed. QE may also exert a structural effect, i.e. an effect 
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belief that coordinated fiscal stimuli are mutually beneficial and allow for 
less deficits, cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, the negative 
parameters of µi and µj in equation (22) confirm that QE, exerting some 
positive effect on inflation and output in the goods market and restoring 
asset substitution in the bond market, reduces both the extent of fiscal 
adjustments and their impact on the spreads. Hence, QE may effectively 
relax the constraints that may prevent the fully decentralised fiscal solution 
discussed in section 3.3.  
 As to the  role of the ECB, it appears as the leader-player who chooses its 
own optimal QE for the EZ as a whole irrespective of the country responses. 
It is entitled to do so because the aggregate effect of the latter is neutral on 
the EZ target of zero inflation gap, though it is not neutral on the average 
spread. Hence, the combination of QE with fiscal accommodation does not 
necessarily entail a threat on monetary dominance. To have an idea of the 
magnitudes at stake compare Table 3 with Table 4, which is obtained from 
equation (22). The result is that country 1, hit by the asymmetric shock, 
should have an additional fiscal expansion, whereas country 2 should have a 
contraction by almost the same amount. All gaps are driven to zero, the 
spread falls less than the average in country 1 and more than the average in 
country 2.  
 
Table 4. Optimal centralised solution and fiscal accommodation at the country level 
(asymmetric shock up1 = −1%, c21 = 0, φ1= φ2 = 0.5)  
µ* 2.6 µ1 1.3 µ2 1.3 
  u*g1 0.69 u*g2 -0.68 
π(µ*) 0.0 π1 0.0 π2 0.0 
y(µ*) 0.0 y1 0.0 y2 0.0 
s(µ*) 3.2 s1 -3.6 s2 -4.7 
 
 Note that in the absence of QE, i.e. if each country were to use the sole 
fiscal policy, the result would be u*g1 = 1.78, u*g2 = 0.45 indicating a larger 
fiscal expansion in both countries, associated with higher, instead of lower, 
spreads. Therefore, as pointed out above, QE contributes to country 
stabilisation by allowing less recourse to fiscal policy. 
_____________________________ 
 
on the parameters of the money market, by reducing the risk perception of 
investors thus restoring high substitutability. 
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  What we have shown is the optimal fiscal accommodation in each 
country. This may of course be attainable to extent that the budget 
constraint given by expression (4) is not violated. If  the constraint is 
binding for one or more countries,  the imbalances left over by the 
centralised QE would remain uncorrected implying further adjustments 
that we leave for further analysis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 The complete success of QE, as engineered by the ECB for the EZ as a 
whole, depends on closing the negative output gaps at the EZ level as well as 
at the country level. This condition may materialise thanks to a new "divine 
coincidence": 1) all countries are alike, 2) the shock originating deflation is 
symmetric, 3) the cross-country distribution of QE is symmetric. Otherwise, 
the old "one size does not fit all" curse will materialise: violation of any of the 
previous conditions implies that QE (if large enough) will work for the EZ as 
a whole, but not for the single countries. In practice we know that the ECB 
has some control on the distribution of QE, by and large proportional to the 
countries' shares in its capital. Yet this distribution criterion is utterly 
unrelated to the problem to be solved. 
 President Draghi's repeated warning is right: monetary policy alone may 
be insufficient; coordinated national fiscal stimuli may be necessary. We 
have shown that such a coordinated solution exists, taking the country 
effects of QE as given, and that QE indeed mitigates the extent of  fiscal 
deficits that would otherwise be necessary. This is clearly important, given 
the normative or market limitations to fiscal policy, which may by 
themselves make QE necessary in the first place. By contrast, with 
normative limitations to the coordinated fiscal accommodation still binding, 
QE may be doomed to failure at the country level with possibly further 
repercussions that deserve to be examined by additional research. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. A note on the New Keynesian consumption function 
The NK consumption function is derived from the Euler equation of the 
intertemporal optimisation problem of a representative household endowed 
with a utility function of the following type 
1 1( )
1
t
t
CU C
−γ −
=
− γ
 
where γ < 1 and σ ≡ 1/γ is the constant elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. The Euler equation is 
Ct/EtCt+1 = (β(1+ rt+1))−σ 
where β is the subjective time discount factor and rt+1 is the real interest 
rate. In steady state, β(1 + rt+1) = 1, and the optimal consumption is 
constant. Hence, r* = 1/β − 1 is the natural rate of interest, which implies β 
= 1/(1 + r*). Any deviation of rt+1 from r* modifies the optimal consumption 
path, shifting consumption to the future, if rt+1 > r*, or to the present, if rt+1 
< r*.  Note that the only information conveyed by the Euler equation is the 
optimal ratio of consumption levels over time. In other words, Ct and  
EtCt+1are not independent;  one can say that Ct "depends on" EtCt+1 as much 
as the other way round. In fact, to determine the two distinct levels of 
consumption, the intertemporal budget constraint should be employed, 
which is usually not done (see Smith and Wickens 2006; Tamborini, 2014). 
Therefore, upon log-linearising the Euler equation around the steady state, 
we obtain 
   ct = −σ 1tˆr +  
where 1tˆr +  is the deviation of the real interest rate from the natural rate, 
and ct is the change in the ratio of present to future consumption. 
 
A2. Portfolio foundation of the LM function 
 In order to stylise some key features of the current financial environment 
of the EZ, we distinguish between domestic and global investors (see also 
Blanchard et al., 2015). Domestic investors are mostly concerned with 
optimising their portfolios in view of their non-financial transactions in the 
domestic economy. To this end, the domestic investors in each country (i = 1, 
2) can combine zero-interest money (Mi) with an interest-bearing domestic 
representative asset (Ai) while taking into account the price level (Pi) and 
the volume of non-financial transactions (Yi). Global investors are instead 
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concerned with optimising pure financial portfolios all across the EZ by 
combining the representative asset of each country. Hence, portfolio choices 
of global investors generate capital movements across countries.22 
 Risk characteristics of domestic and global investors may possibly be 
different, but this detail is unnecessary here, so we assume a single typical 
exponential utility function of wealth, with constant absolute risk aversion ρ 
∈ [0,1]. Provided that returns to assets are normally distributed N ∼ (Ri, 
σ2i), each investor maximises his/her expected wealth E(W) when the 
function 
   F = E(W) − (ρ/2)σ2W  
is maximal. 
 The money demand and capital movement functions in the text can be 
understood as rates of variation around the optimal portfolio allocations to 
be derived below, for a given constant wealth endowment. 
 
Domestic investors 
 Domestic investors own a real amount of wealth given by 
   Wi/Pi= Ai/Pi + Mi/Pi 
Given Pi, its expected value is given by the expected return to the asset 
stock RiAi net of the costs of non-financial transactions Yi. These are 
assumed to be quadratic in the difference between Yi and real money 
holdings Mi/Pi. Therefore, the optimal money holding results from 
maximising the function F net of transaction costs under the wealth 
constraint, i.e. 
   2 2 21max ( / / ) ( / ) ( / / )
2 2i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
F R W P M P Y M P W P M Pρ= − − − − σ −   
which yields 
   ( )22
1* / /
1i i i i i i ii
M P Y R W P= − + ρσ
+ ρσ
  
   ( )2
1* / /
1i i i i i ii
A P R Y W P= − +
+ ρσ
 
 We thus obtain the standard money demand function which is 
homogenous of degree 1 in the price level, increasing in the volume of non-
financial transactions, decreasing in the expected rate of return to the asset 
                                            
22 The country location of global investors is immaterial because portfolio shifts 
imply that sales of asset i (capital outflows from country i) are matched by 
purchases of asset j (capital inflows in country j). 
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(interest rate for short),  plus a positive wealth effect. As said in the text, 
money-asset substitutability, or the responsiveness of  money demand to the 
interest rate, falls as the riskiness of the asset and/or the investors' risk 
aversion rise. Note that in this particular formulation the non-financial 
transactions and the interest rate have the same coefficient. In the text we 
have posited the more general case in which the two coefficients may be 
different. 
 
Global investors 
 Global investors aim to maximise the value of their wealth given by 
   W = A1 + A2 
It is sufficient to consider nominal wealth because by assumption global 
investors' geographical location is irrelevant (and hence so are the location 
of their personal consumption and the specific price level in any location). 
Maximisation of the function F under the constraint W yields the demands 
for the two asset stocks: 
   A*1 = 
1
a b+
(R1 − R2) + 
b
a b+
W 
   A*2 = 
1
a b+
(R2 − R1) + 
a
a b+
W 
where a = ρ(σ21 − σ12), b = ρ(σ22 − σ12).  
 Again, we obtain the standard portfolio result whereby the demand for 
each asset is proportional to its own interest-rate differential plus a wealth 
effect. Cross-country asset substitutability is determined by the parameters 
a and b, i.e. the risk parameters of the two assets and the degree of risk 
aversion of investors. The responsiveness of each asset to its own interest-
rate differential is symmetric, which implies that as R1 (R2) rises relative to 
R2 (R1) the demand for A1 increases (decreases) and that for A2 decreases 
(increases) by the same amount. This change in asset holdings generate a 
capital movement from country 1 to country 2.  
On this account, it is interesting to note that the optimal asset holdings 
imply the following interest-rate differential  
  R1 − R2 = aA*1 − bA*2 
Hence any non-zero spread may develop according to combinations of: (i) the 
sign and size of the risk factors  a and b, (ii) the outstanding stocks of the 
two assets, i.e. the so-called relative supply effect. Though various 
combinations are possible, typically asset A1 will pay a spread over asset A2 
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to the extent that it is more risky (σ21 > σ22 → a > b) and/or it is in larger 
supply 
  
A3. Parameterisation of the model 
 
Parameter  Source 
αp = 0.73 Private expenditure/GDP EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
αg = 0.23 Public sector contribution to 
GDP 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
αx = 0.04 Foreign sector contribution to 
GDP 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
θ = 0.66 Intra-EZ share of foreign 
trade 
EZ average value 2000-14, Eurostat, 
AMECO database 
τ = 0.45 Total revenue/GDP General government, EZ average 
value 2000-14, Eurostat, AMECO 
database 
σ = 0.2 Interest-rate elasticity of 
private demand Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2005) 
β = 0.99 Discount factor Standard value in literature 
η = 0.086 Output-gap elasticity of 
inflation 
Implied by the Calvo equation, given 
β and 75% of non-adjusted prices 
(e.g. Smets and Vouters (2003), Luk 
and Vines (2015)) 
p = 0, 0.05 Probability of output gap 
persistence  
bs/(ms+bs) 
= 0.4 
 
ms/bs= 1.5 
Coefficient of the spread in 
country i w.r.t. the spread in 
country j 
Ehrman and Fratzscher (2015), i = 
Italy, j = Germany 
my=1 
 
ms = 0.8 
Income elasticity of money 
demand 
Interest-rate semi-elasticity 
of money demand 
Calza et al. (2001), Beyer (2009) 
 
